Our people resisting the coup:
We followed the Revolutionary Front’s launching of what it called an initiative (the initiative of the Revolutionary Front to solve the Sudanese crisis… Sudan first).
This description of the Revolutionary Front, in our opinion, is inaccurate and incorrect, and it is a complete transgression and disregards what happened, which is the coup of October 25, 2021, which resulted from an alliance between the coup authorities, led by the head of the Coup Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and he made a two-and-a-half-year political deal. It concluded with the restoration of the deposed regime, the ousted Islamic movement, and the dissolved National Congress Party, as well as the revocation of the provisions and articles of the law aimed at dismantling the regime of June 30, 1989, and recovering public funds, and returned all looted assets to them.
The initiative of the Revolutionary Front, which we reviewed some of its articles, called for allocating 100 seats in the Legislative Council to resistance committees, with 15 representatives from the state of Khartoum and five representatives from each state, and each party receiving one seat, the Sudanese Professionals Association receiving two seats, and armed movements receiving 25%. It is merely a bargaining position, rather than a crisis-resolution initiative, as the Revolutionary Front has described it. This is an example of the mentality and thinking of the leaders of the armed movements on the issues of the democratic transition and the overthrow of the revolution, bearing in mind that the pre-coup constitutional document had established a framework that granted the Revolutionary Front and its armed movements a good political status. Nonetheless, it backed the coup against the transitional government and the revolution, as well as taking positions in favor of the coup authorities and upholding its stances, making it an obvious and clear participant in the coup.
Our brave people:
The Revolutionary Front’s position and presence in the coup authority, as well as its retention of all the privileges of the Juba Peace Agreement, which was included in the 2019 constitutional document in November 2020, do not qualify it to launch a political initiative that does not include the conditions and demands of the Sudanese people who reject the coup, because it is a partner in the current government and its forces have been involved in arresting, killing, and running over peaceful revolutionaries for last six months.
This initiative is rejected by us because it does not reflect the aspirations of the Sudanese people who reject the coup, but rather is a negotiating position and an attempt by the Revolutionary Front to remain relevant because they know the coup’s downfall is imminent, which will necessitate reconsidering the Juba Peace Agreement, which did not benefit the sons and daughters of our great people in Darfur, eastern, northern, or central Sudan. However, the signatories of this agreement benefited politically and socially the benefit of a small group of the affiliates of their movements.